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Abstract
This paper studies the structure and time consistency of optimal monetary
policy from a public ﬁnance perspective in an economy where agents diﬀer in
preference for liquidity and holdings of nominal assets.
I ﬁnd that the presence of redistributional eﬀects breaks the link between
time consistency and high inﬂation which characterizes representative agent
models of optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy. For a large class of economies, op-
timal monetary policy is time consistent. I relate these ﬁndings to key historical
episodes of inﬂation and deﬂation.
∗I wish to thank Marco Bassetto, Martin Eichenbaum and, especially, Lawrence J. Christiano
for their guidance. I am also indebted to Gadi Barlevy, Ariel Burstein and Alex Monge for helpful
comments. All errors are mine.1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study the structure and the time consistency of optimal
monetary policy from a public ﬁnance perspective in an economy where agents are
heterogeneous in holdings of currency and other nominal assets. The seminal work of
Calvo (1978) and Lucas and Stokey (1983)1 illustrates that in a monetary economy
a benevolent policymaker has the incentive to tax outstanding nominal assets via
unanticipated inﬂation when lump-sum taxation is not available. On this basis, lack of
commitment has been advocated as a potential explanation of persistent high inﬂation
and high public deﬁcits. In the presence of nominal assets and distortionary taxation,
rational agents anticipate the policymaker’s incentive to revise policy in the direction
of higher money growth. This leads to high inﬂation in equilibrium. Moreover, the
equilibrium inﬂation rate is positively correlated with the level of outstanding nominal
government debt.
I ﬁnd that the presence of redistributional motives breaks the link between time
consistency and high inﬂation which characterizes representative agent models of op-
timal ﬁscal and monetary policy. The incentive to generate unaticipated inﬂation
depends crucially on the distribution of currency and other nominal assets, as well as
on the distribution of political power. Optimal monetary policy is time consistent for
a large class of economies.
Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Chamley (1985) argue that time consistency of op-
timal monetary policy can be achieved if the monetary authority can commit to a
path for nominal prices. Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1987) exhibit a particular
debt management strategy, involving both nominal and indexed government bonds of
various maturities, that can remove the problem of time inconsistency. The ﬁndings
in this paper suggest that optimal monetary policy could be made time consistent by
inﬂuencing the distribution of government debt. This argument is not new. Hamilton
(1795) argued in favor of the Federal assumption of the states’ war debt as a way to
reduce the risk of monetization. Debt assumption would provide powerful government
creditors with a strong incentive to support Federal tax legislation, making the use of
inﬂation to raise revenues less likely.
I describe a cash-credit good economy in which households have diﬀerent prefer-
ences over cash and credit goods and diﬀer in holdings of nominal bonds. Households
chose consumption and labor supply and are subject to proportional labor income
taxation. The government issues money and nominal debt and collects labor income
taxes to ﬁnance an exogenous stream of government spending. Monetary and ﬁs-
cal policy redistribute resources across households. Inﬂation weighs more heavily on
households who consume a greater fraction of cash-goods and unanticipated inﬂation
hits holders of nominal assets. The share of labor income tax revenues collected from
each type of household is proportional to supplied labor, which is inversely related to
outstanding nominal wealth.
First, I study optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy for a benevolent government
with the ability to commit to future policy and I trace out the Pareto frontier for
1Kydland and Prescott (1977), and Barro and Gordon (1983, a and b) emplore the consequences
of the time inconsistency of monetary policy in an expectational Phillips curve environment.
2this economy. I concentrate on a class of utility speciﬁcations with unitary income
elasticity of money demand. As discussed in Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1996), the
Friedman rule is optimal in these economies with no heterogeneity. I ﬁnd that the
Friedman rule is optimal if and only if the government wishes to redistribute to agents
with a larger weight on cash goods, otherwise high rates of inﬂation and government
deﬁcits will result. I then proceed to characterize the suﬃcient conditions for time
consistency of the optimal policy and characterize the optimal ﬁscal and monetary
policy when the government choses policy sequentially and has no ability to commit.
I assume that in each period ﬁscal and monetary policy are chosen before households
can adjust their holdings of currency, following Svensson (1985).
Distributional goals have ambivalent eﬀects on government incentives. On one
hand, the lack of a full menu of redistributional policy instruments may increase the
incentive to revise pre-announced policy2. On the other, the redistributional eﬀects
of inﬂation may remove the incentive to deviate from the ex ante optimal policy.
Therefore, the time consistency of optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy depends on the
balance between redistribution and eﬃciency.
I ﬁnd that, for a large class of economies, lack of commitment does not imply a
higher equilibrium rate of inﬂation. With no government debt outstanding, the opti-
mal policy under commitment is time consistent if the Pareto weight on households
with higher weight on cash goods is suﬃciently high. If the level of government debt
outstanding is positive, the government has an incentive to reduc money growth and
increase the tax rate on labor, relative to expectations, if households with holdings a
larger fraction of government debt are assigned a higher Pareto weight. This induces
a rise in the real interest rate, redistributing resources to households who are net cred-
itors to the government. Therefore, if households with a high weight on cash goods
have a suﬃciently high Pareto weight and hold a suﬃciently high fraction of govern-
ment debt, the optimal policy is time consistent. If households with low weight on
cash goods hold a suﬃciently high fraction of government debt and have a suﬃciently
high Pareto weight, the optimal policy under commitment is not time consistent but
the optimal deviation involves a fall in the inﬂation rate relative to expectations.
If these conditions do not hold, the time consistent policy involves higher inﬂation
than under commitment. Moreover, the time consistent inﬂation rate is higher than
in an economy with no heterogeneity, given that both eﬃciency and redistributional
incentives push the government towards higher tha exoected money growth. Under
the time consistent policy, households with a larger weight on cash goods suﬀer large
welfare losses, reaching 7-10% of per period consumption in a plausibly parametrized
version of the economy.
To evaluate the relevance of these ﬁndings, I analyze a number of key historical
episodes of large inﬂations and deﬂation. Descriptive accounts of these episodes pro-
vide clear evidence of the importanc of redistributional consequences of unanticipated
changes in inﬂation in shaping government incentives, conditional on the political in-
ﬂuence of diﬀerent groups of agents on monetary and ﬁscal policy decisions.
2Persson and Tabellini (1997) suggest that, with heterogeneity, time inconsistency may arise even
with lump-sum taxes, if they are not agent speciﬁc. Pearce and Stacchetti (1997) study an economy
w h e r et h i si si n d e e dt h ec a s e .
3The plan of the paper is as follows. The next subsection reviews the literature
on the time consistency of optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy with heterogeneous
agents. The model economy is presented in Section 2. Section 3 studies optimal ﬁscal
and monetary policy under commitment and characterizes the suﬃcient conditions
for time consistency. Section 4 reviews a number of historical episodes of inﬂation
and disinﬂation. The optimal policy without commitment is analyzed in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes.
1.1. Previous Literature
This paper is closely related to the work of Nicolini (1998) who evaluates the conditions
under which optimal monetary policy is time consistent when agents are heterogeneous
in their ability to adjust currency holdings in response to unanticipated changes in
inﬂation. He also analyzes a representative agent cash in advance economy in which
households cannot adjust their holdings of currency in response to unanticipated
changes in inﬂation. He ﬁnds that optimal monetary policy is not time consistent
in general but that for certain conditions the optimal deviation involves a fall in the
rate of money growth. The conditions involve the distribution of the Pareto weights
and the price elasticity of cash good consumption. Nicolini does not consider labor
income taxation and stops short of analyzin gt h ec a s ew i t hn o m i n al government debt.
The ﬁndings on the suﬃcient conditions for time consistency are also related to
Caselli (1997). This paper studies public debt runs under alternative assumptions on
the distribution of taxes among tax bases, the distribution of debt among classes of
taxpayers and the distributive preferences of the government. The results suggest that
the probability of a run on government debt, which depends on the perceived credibil-
ity of the government, is decreasing in the degree of identiﬁcation of the government
with a speciﬁc constituency and in the fraction of debt held by this constituency.
Caselli also provides empirical evidence from a sample of high-debt OECD countries
broadly consistent with these results.
Rogers (1986) is the ﬁrst to formally analyze whether a government’s distributive
goals can inhibit its incentive to renege on announced policies. She analyzes the issue
in the context of a two-period, multiple consumer model of optimal wage and interest
taxation. She ﬁnds that inconsistent interest tax increases may be moderated if they
create an unacceptable utility distribution in the economy.
2. A Cash-Credit Good Economy with Heterogenous House-
holds
In this section, I describe a version of Lucas and Stokey’s cash-credit good economy
with two key modiﬁcations. First, there are two types of households having diﬀerent
preferences over cash and credit goods. Second, in each period trade in goods and
labor precedes trade in assets. This timing, introduced by Svensson (1985), implies
that households cannot adjust the amount of currency available for purchases in the
current period to changes in the inﬂation rate. The economy is populated by house-
holds, ﬁrms and a government. Households consume cash and credit goods and supply
4labor. Firms have access to a linear production technology that requires labor for the
production of consumption goods. They are perfectly competitive. The government
ﬁnances an exogenous stream of spending by issuing nominal debt, printing money
and taxing labor income at a uniform proportional rate. There is no uncertainty.
I now illustrate the problems faced by the agents in our economy in detail.
2.1. Firms
Firms live for one period. They hire labor to produce consumption goods with a




Here y1t is total production of cash goods and y2t total production of credit goods at
time t and nt is aggregate labor. Perfect competition implies:
P1t = P2t = Pt = Wt,
where Pt is the price charged for consumption goods and Wt the nominal wage at
time t.
2.2. Households
There is a continuum of unit measure of households, divided into two types, where
0 < νi < 1 is the fraction of type i agents, with i =1 ,2 and
P
i νi =1 .H o u s e h o l d so f
the same type are identical. Households have preferences deﬁned over consumption of






ci = hi (ci1,ci2),
where hi (·) is homothetic, U is continuous, concave and twice diﬀerentiable and
Ui
1 ≥ 0 and Ui
2 ≤ 0.L e i s u r ea n dci are gross substitutes.
Households purchase consumption goods, supply labor, accumulate currency and
trade one-period nominal discount bonds in each period. They enter a period with
Mit units of currency and Bit holdings of one-period risk-free nominal discount bonds.
They are subject to a cash in advance constraint for purchases of cash goods, given
by:
Ptci1t − Mit ≤ 0. (2.1)
The asset market session follows trading in the goods and labor market. During the
asset market session households receive labor income net of taxes, clear consumption
liabilities and trade bonds issued by other households or by the government at price
Qt. Bonds purchased at time t entitle holders to one unit of currency in the asset
market section at t +1 . I assume that the government cannot default on its debt,
5which implies that agents are indiﬀerent between holding privately or government
issued bonds, which trade at the same price. If the government does not issue debt,
the bonds will be in zero net supply. Total holdings of debt by agent i at the end of
time t are denoted with Bit+1 for i =1 ,2.
Households face the following constraint on the asset market:
Mt+1 + QtBit+1 ≤ Mit + Bit − Ptci1t − Ptci2t + Wt (1 − τt)nit, (2.2)
where Wt is the nominal wage and τt is the tax rate on labor income.
2.3. Government
The government ﬁnances an exogenous stream of consumption ¯ g and is subject to the
following dynamic budget constraint:
Pt¯ gt + Mt + Bt = QtBt+1 + Mt+1 + Wtτtnt, (2.3)
where Mt,B t are the supply of currency and nominal bonds respectively.
2.4. Private Sector Equilibrium
T h et i m i n go fe v e n t si ne a c hp e r i o di sa sf o l l o w s :
1. Households come into the period with holdings of currency and debt given by
Mit and Bit.
2. The government sets policy subject to (2.3).
3. Households, ﬁrms and the government trade on the goods and labor markets.
The households’ purchases of cash goods are subject to (2.1). Equilibrium on
the goods market requires:
X
i=1,2
νi (ci1t + ci2t − nit)+¯ gt =0 . (2.4)
4. Asset markets open. Households purchase bonds and acquire currency to take








Deﬁnition 2.1. A private sector equilibrium is given by a government policy {¯ gt,τt,M t+1,B t+1}t≥0 ,
a price system {Pt,W t,Q t}t≥0,j∈[0,1] and an allocation {ci1t,c i2t,n it,y 1t,y 2t}i=1,2,t≥0
such that:
61. given the policy and the price system households and ﬁrm optimize;
2. government policy satisﬁes (2.3);
3. markets clear.
The following proposition characterizes the competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 2.2. An allocation {ci1t,c i2t,n it,y 1t,y 2t}i=1,2,t≥0 and a price system
{Pt,W t,Q t}t≥0,j∈[0,1] constitute a private sector equilibrium if and only if, for a given
government policy {¯ gt,τt,M t+1,B t+1}t≥0 , (2.4), (2.3) and the following conditions
are veriﬁed:


























(Pt+1ci1t+1 − Mit+1)=0 ,
Pt+1ci1t+1 ≤ Mit+1,
for t ≥ 0, and:











for i =1 ,2.
Equation (2.8) is the households’ intertemporal budget constraint and it incorpo-
rates the transversality condition. The proof of this proposition is standard.
3. Optimal Policy with Commitment
Id e ﬁne the Ramsey equilibrium as the private sector equilibrium which maximizes
the government’s objective function, given by the weighted sum of the households’
lifetime utility. The Pareto weight on type i agents is ηi, with η1 + η2 =1 . Ia s s u m e
that Pareto weights are time-invariant. The case ηi = νi corresponds to a utilitarian
government.
The Ramsey equilibrium outcome can be characterized by solving the “primal
government problem”, where the government chooses an allocation at time 0 subject
to the constraint that it constitutes a private sector equilibrium. This problem’s choice
7variables are {ci1t,c i2t,n it}i=1,2,t≥0 and P0. The level of P0 determines the real value
of nominal assets at time 0 and deﬁnes the boundary of the agents’ intertemporal
budget set. High values of P0 amount to a tax on outstanding nominal wealth and on
consumption of goods purchased with cash at time 0. The government is constrained
to tax all nominal assets at the same rate. The extent to which each household is hit
by this tax depends on the exogenous distribution of currency and bonds at time 0
and on liquidity preference.



















for t ≥ 0 and i =1 ,2. In the Ramsey allocation problem I let the government select
m10, which is equivalent to chosing P0.
Proposition 3.1. An allocation {ci1t,c i2t,n it}i=1,2,t≥0 and initial level of real bal-

































m20 = φmm10, (3.5)
and (2.7), (2.4).
A detailed proof of this characterization can be found in Chari and Kehoe (1998).
83.1. Properties of Optimal Policy for t>0
In this section, I illustrate the key properties of Ramsey equilibrium policy for t>0.
To sharpen the analysis, I specialize to the following utility speciﬁcation3:
h1 (c11,c12)=c11. (3.6)
Since c12t ≡ 0, constraint (3.1) drops out of the problem, while constraint (3.2) holds
for i =2only.
Type 1 agents are only aﬀected by the wedge (1 − τt)Qt−1, while type 2 agents
are separately aﬀected by the wedge introduced by the tax rate on labor and positive
nominal interest rates. An increase in nominal interest rates - a lower value of Qt -
increases the price of consumption for type 1 agents. For type 2 agents, it corresponds
to an increase in the price of cash goods relative to credit goods at time t. If cash and
credit goods are gross substitutes, the level of credit good consumption will increase
with nominal interest rates. If the weight of credit goods in type 2’s utility function
and the weight of type 2 in government preferences are high enough, it will be optimal
to set the discount rate positive, since this makes the price of consumption lower for
type 2 relative to type 1.
I ﬁrst show that the incentive to use inﬂation to redistribute resources across
households of diﬀerent types arises when the government does not have access to a
full set of redistributional instruments.
Proposition 3.2. If the government has access to individual speciﬁc proportional
labor income taxation then in any Ramsey equilibrium Qt =1for t ≥ 0.
The proof is in Appendix A and is analogous to the proof of the optimality of the
Friedman rule in the environment with distorting taxes analyzed by Christiano, Chari
and Kehoe (1996). It relies on the homotheticity of the consumption aggregator, which
implies a unitary income elasticity of money demand. Intuitively, if the government
can set diﬀerent labor tax rates for diﬀerent agents, real net wages need not be
equalized and constraint (3.3) drops out of the problem. In this case, optimality
requires equalizing the relative price of cash and credit goods.
Let ¯ η1 denote the Pareto weight such that government policy is neutral from a
redistributional standpoint. It is given by the value of η1 for which the constraint














The following result holds if the labor income tax schedule is linear.
Proposition 3.3. For h2
12 ≤ h2
22 and U2
12 ≤ 0,in the Ramsey equilibrium, Qt < 1 for
t ≥ 0 if and only if η1 < ¯ η1.
3The results under a more general speciﬁcation are presented in Chapter 3.
9The proof is in Appendix A.






− γni, for i =1 ,2, (3.7)
c
1−σ





with z1 =0 ,z 2 ∈ (0,1), σ ∈ (0,1], and γ > 0. The restriction on σ ensures that labor
supply increases with the real wage. The assumption of constant marginal disutility
of labor4 implies that the Ramsey equilibrium government policy at time t depends on
¯ gt only. In particular, if government spending is constant, then Ramsey equilibrium
policy is constant for t>0. Moreover, the distribution of cash holdings across agents




















For σ < 1, cash and credit goods are substitutes for type 2 households and P2
t <
P1
t . A lower price of credit goods relative to cash goods redistributes in favor of type
2 agents, since the net real wage, deﬁned as the ratio of the nominal wage in eﬃciency
units to the consumption price index, is higher for type 2:








Therefore, setting the nominal interest rate above the Friedman rule allows the
government to redistribute in favor of type 2 households.
To evaluate the impact of redistributional incentives I compute the Ramsey equi-
librium as a function of the Pareto weight for a plausibly parametrized version of the
economy. I set z2 to match post-WWII US data on average M2 velocity for the pref-
erence speciﬁcation in (3.7)-(3.8). I set ν1 to match the percentage of US households
having no ﬁnancial assets except for a checking account, according to the 1995 Survey
of Consumer Finances. The value of σ determines both the compensated elasticity
of labor supply with respect to the real wage and the interest elasticity of money
4A constant marginal disutility of labor implies that the government’s intertemporal problem
separates into inﬁnitely many indipendent maximization problems, each corresponding to a time
period. Therefore, policy across periods will diﬀer in equilibrium only to the extent that the “fun-
damentals” of the government problem, like tax base elasticities, outstanding nominal liabilities or










10demand. I set σ so that the compensated elasticity of labor supply equals 0.25, which
is within the range of values reported by macroeconomic and microeconomic studies.
For these values of σ,z 2 and νi the interest elasticity of money demand6 is equal to
3.052 at a nominal interest rate of 8% - slightly lower than estimates reported in the
literature (e.g. Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000) and Chari, Christiano and Kehoe
(1993) ). I set the level of government debt at time 0 to 40% of GDP when τ0 =0 .30
and the net nominal interest rate is equal to 6%7.
Table 1: Benchmark Parameter Values
α β γ ν1
0.654 0.97 3 0.56
σ 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
g 0.0467 0.592 0.0715 0.0833
ψ 0.588 0.564 0.568 0.571
ψ1 0.851 0.834 0.817 0.802
ψ2 0.8511 0.834 0.817 0.802
Results are displayed in Figures 3.1-3.2. In each panel, the solid line corresponds to
the optimal policy for t>0, the dotted line corresponds to optimal policy at t =0and
a vertical dotted line is placed at η1 =¯ η1, the Pareto weight for which the government
does not pursue redistributional goals. Figure 2.1 displays the Ramsey equilibrium
policy as a function of η1 for ψi =0for i =1 ,2. The equilibrium inﬂation rate reaches
40% for the lowest value of η1 considered, the tax rate on labor is increasing in η1,
ranging from 10% to 31% for t>0. Figure 2.2 displays the Ramsey equilibrium policy
as a function on ¯ g for two values of η1. The tax rate on labor increases with ¯ g for both
values of η1. In the top panels, η1 < ¯ η1. Here, the nominal interest rate is positive and
decreases with ¯ g, and at ¯ g =0the labor tax rate is negative. For η1 ≥ ¯ η1, the nominal
interest rate is 0, with the tax rate on labor equal to 0 for ¯ g =0 . These results clearly
hinge on the trade-oﬀ between redistribution and eﬃciency. When ¯ g =0and there
is no debt outstanding, the government need not raise any revenues and should set
the inﬂation and the labor tax rate to 0 to maximize eﬃciency. However, if η1 < ¯ η1
it is optimal to tax currency holdings and subsidize labor. Since the elasticity of the
inﬂation tax base is higher than that of the labor tax base, this scheme generates a
cost which increases with ¯ g and eventually oﬀsets the incentives to redistribute.
3.2. Suﬃcient Conditions for Time Consistency
In this section, I illustrate the potential sources of time inconsistency and provide
an analytical characterization of the suﬃcient conditions for time consistency of the





where M/P are aggregate real money balances.
7This is the average value for the post-WWII period in the U.S., as reported by Chari and Kehoe
(1998)























































































































 at t>0 --, at t=0 ** 
Figure 3.1: Ramsey equilibrium policy as a function of η1.















































































































































































 at t>0 --, at t=0 ** 
Figure 3.2: Ramsey equilibrium policy as a function of g.
13The fact that government spending and the marginal disutility of labor are con-
stant implies that a government selecting policy for time 0 in the Ramsey equilibrium
faces the same incentives as a government setting policy sequentially. At time 0 the
elasticity of the inﬂation tax base is lower than at t>0, since private sector deci-
sions on the accumulation of nominal wealth and on payment arrangements are taken
irreversibly before policy is chosen. Time 0 policy can therefore be viewed as the “op-
timal deviation” from the Ramsey plan, namely, the policy that a government with
the same Pareto weights would choose if allowed to re-optimize, when confronted with
the same distribution of currency and debt. The government’s incentives for depart-
ing at time 0 from the policy which is optimal for t>0 depend on the distribution
of nominal assets, as well as on the Pareto weight.
I ﬁrst analyze the case in which outstanding debt holdings are 0 for both types and
the distribution of currency at time 0 is the same as the steady state distribution. This
corresponds to the case in ﬁgure 3.1. For η1 < ¯ η1 nominal interest rates are positive
for t>0 and the cash in advance constraint is binding. Since holdings of currency
are predetermined at time 0, the price elasticity of cash good consumption is 1, while
it is equal to 1/σ at t>0.F o rσ < 1, it is eﬃcient to tax cash good consumption at
a higher rate at time 0. This eﬀect is also present in a representative agent economy
as illustrated in Nicolini (1998). A higher value of P0 (or equivalently, a lower value
of m10) also corresponds to a lower relative price of credit goods which favors of type
2 households. Since the redistributional eﬀect reinforces the incentive arising from
eﬃciency considerations, the increase of the inﬂation tax relative to expectations will
typically be larger than in the corresponding representative agent economy.
For η1 > ¯ η1, nominal interest rates are 0 for t>0, so that if the government were
to follow this policy the cash in advance constraint would be non-binding, making the
response of cash good consumption to small changes in the price level the same as for
t>0. Larger increases in the price level would cause the cash in advance constraint
to be binding and cash good consumption to fall one-to-one with an increase in the
price level. Since the government wishes to redistribute to type 1 households, it is
optimal to generate a rise in the relative price of credit goods. Since the price of cash
goods relative to credit goods is already at its lowest, the only feasible deviation is
to increase the relative price of credit goods in the current period relative to future
periods. This can be achieved by taxing labor income at a higher rate at time 0,
which allows for decreased money growth between time 0 and time 18.
If outstanding government debt is positive, the elasticity of the inﬂation tax base
is always lower at time 0 than at t>0, since taxation of nominal debt holdings is
non-distortionary. The households’ inability to adjust currency holdings in response
to inﬂation imposes an upper bound to the extent to which an increase in inﬂation
is desirable ex post. If debt is evenly distributed across households or η1 =¯ η1,
for which the distribution of wealth is irrelevant, this is the prevailing incentive.










β (1 − τ0)
. (3.10)
Here, the second and third equality obtain from the households’ ﬁrst order conditions.
14If the distribution of debt is uneven and η1 6=¯ η1, the redistributional impact of
“unexpected” inﬂation may oﬀset the gains in eﬃciency. Whether this occurs depends
on the distribution of debt. For ηi > ¯ ηi and ψi is suﬃciently high, it is optimal for
the government to reduce money growth between time 0 and time 1, causing P0 to
fall. The resulting rise in the real interest rate between time 0 and time 1 favors type
i, who in this case is a net buyer of bonds on the time 0 asset market. Consequently,
for η1 > ¯ η1 the Ramsey equilibrium is time consistent for a suﬃciently high level of
ψ1, even with government debt. For η2 > ¯ η2, this will not be the case, but for high
values of ψ2 inﬂation is low and the labor tax high rate relative to expectations in
the optimal deviation.
Figure 3.3 shows an example of a distribution of nominal assets for which the
Ramsey equilibrium and the Markov equilibrium policy would coincide for η1 large
enough. Here, outstanding government debt equals 40% of the aggregate stock of
currency at time 0 and ψ1 =1while ψ2 = −1.59. The vertical dashed line corresponds
to ¯ η1. Values of η1 greater than the vertical solid line correspond to economies where
the Markov and Ramsey equilibrium would coincide.
I formalize this reasoning in the following proposition9.
Proposition 3.4. The Ramsey equilibrium is time consistent if the distribution of
currency at time 0 is the same as the equilibrium distribution of currency for t>0
i.e. φm = φ1,a n di f :
1. λ1ψ1 + λ2φmψ2 =0and σ =1for η1 < ¯ η1,
or
2. λ1 (1 + ψ1)+λ2φm (1 + ψ2)=0and λ1 + φmλ2 ≥ 0 for η1 ≥ ¯ η1.
Here, λi is the multiplier on the implementability constraint of type i in the
Ramsey allocation problem. The proof is in Appendix B.
This proposition identiﬁes the class of distributions of nominal assets for which
the Ramsey equilibrium is time consistent. Given the stationarity properties of the
environment studied here, this strategy is equivalent to the more general approach
followed by Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Bassetto (1999)10.
9This proposition holds under the assumption that outright default on government debt is not
permitted, as in Lucas and Stokey (1983).
10The general procedure required to identify the suﬃcient conditions for time consistency is as
follows. First, compute the Ramsey equilibrium at t =0with the distribution of currency and debt
given by φm and {ψ1, ψ2}, respectively. Derive φ0
m and {ψ0
1, ψ0
2}, the distribution of currency
a n dd e b ta tt h eb e g i n n i n go ft i m e1 from the time 0 dynamic budget constraint, evaluated at the
prices corresponding to the time 0 Ramsey equilibrium. Then, solve the Ramsey allocation problem
at {ψ0
1, ψ0
2}, with the same Pareto weights, subject to the implementability constraints starting
from t =1 . Finally, search for the value of {ψ1,ψ2} such that the Ramsey equilibrium outcome at
{ψ1,ψ2} for t>0 is the same as the Ramsey equilibrium at {ψ0
1, ψ0
2} for t ≥ 1.
Due to the constancy of ¯ g and of the marginal disutility of labor, which rules out dynamic in-
terdependecies between government policy in subsequent periods, time consistency requires that the
Ramsey equilibrium at t =1be constant and that λ0
i = λi, where λ0
i is the multiplier on type i’s
implementability constraint in the Ramsey equilibrium at t =1 . Therefore, the Ramsey equilibrium
is time consistent if the allocation is constant for t ≥ 0.
























































































































Figure 3.3: Example of a time consistent Ramsey equilibrium.
16The ﬁrst set of conditions are for the case in which type 1 households have a lower
Pareto weight. To ensure time consistency there must be no gain in eﬃciency from
taxing cash good consumption at a higher rate at time 0 i.e. labor income taxation
is non-distortionary. In addition, the net redistributional gain of taxing nominal debt
holdings via changes in the general price level must be 0. To see this note that the
multiplier on the households’ implementability constraints, λi,represents the shadow
value to the government of transferring resources to type i. In equilibrium, λi is an
increasing function of ηi. The second set of conditions is for the case in which the
government wishes to redistribute to type 1 agents. In this case, since the cash in
advance constraint is non binding in equilibrium the price elasticity of cash good
consumption is the same in all periods, so the condition σ =1is not required to
ensure time consistency. It is replaced by the second condition, which ensures that
the net gain from taxing currency holdings is suﬃciently small by imposing a lower
bound on the shadow value of economywide liquidity, which guarantees that a unitary
relative price of cash and credit goods. The ﬁrst condition ensures that the net gain
of taxing nominal asset holdings via changes in the general price level is 0.
3.3. Does Lack of Commitment Imply High Inﬂation?
Heterogeneity in holdings of nominal wealth and the demand for cash goods implies
that monetary policy has redistributional eﬀects and the time consistency of the
Ramsey equilibrium depends on the balance between redistributional and eﬃciency
incentives. This weakens the link between high inﬂation and time consistency. First,
surprisingly high rates of inﬂation may be optimal even with commitment. Therefore,
credibility of government policy does not imply low inﬂation. On the other hand, due
to the redistributional eﬀects of inﬂation, if the government is allowed to reassess pol-
icy, it will not necessarily select a rate of inﬂation higher than previously announced.
If the distribution of nominal wealth and income are suﬃciently uneven, potentially
high levels of nominal government debt may be consistent with low inﬂation, even
without commitment.
These ﬁndings contrast with the results for a representative agent economy, where
-as shown in Lucas and Stokey (1983)- it is never possible to guarantee time consis-
tency11 in a monetary economy where outstanding government debt is positive and
denominated in nominal terms. The resulting prediction is that economies in which
nominal government debt is mostly held by the economic group having more polit-
ical power are less subject to high inﬂation, independently of the level of nominal
aggregate debt.
4. Empirical Evidence
The distribution of nominal wealth and the distribution of political power among
classes of agents with diﬀerent exposure to the eﬀects of inﬂation played a crucial
11This is true is the government cannot commit to a pre-announced path of prices, which would
make all government debt real, or if debt denominated in real terms is not available, as shown in
Persson, Persson and Svensson (1987).
17role in shaping monetary policy decisions in a number of historical episodes of large
inﬂations and deﬂations.
Johnson (1970) provides a detailed description of the behavior of inﬂa t i o ni nE n g -
land in the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution:
”When the Bank of England recieved its charter [1694] ... its directors
cultivated all possible contact with parlamentarians, on whom they relied
for periodic renewal of the charter.”
”Fierce dispute broke out as to what ... should be the remedy. To
return to the good old standard would mean ... bankrupcy of many in
trade and enrichment of old creditors. Devaluation would ... protect and
stabilize domestic trade though initially hit the foreign trader. ... With
landed property predominant in government the issue was never in doubt.
The recoinage of 1897-1698 returned to Elisabeth’s silver standard.”
The same political forces played a role in successive episodes of deﬂa-
tion in England, for example in 1815, as Johnson (1970) reports:
”The unitary in monetary interest in the gold standard... included
...the owners of Consols sold to ﬁnance the war with Napoleon at a time of
skyhigh prices and interest rates. ...In returning to gold, Lord Liverpool
thus handed a large bonus to the landed gentry and to a new monied
middle class”.
Redistributional concerns can also account for the large monetization which oc-
cured in France after the Revolution in 1789. White (1896) reports the following:
“Mirabeu..showed that he was fully aware of the dangers of inﬂation,
but he yielded to the pressure... partly because he thought it important
to sell government lands rapidly to the people, and so develop speedily a
large class of landholders, pledged to stand by the government who gave
them their titles.”
“This outgrowth [in money] was the creation of a great debtor class in
the nation, directly interested in the depreciation of the currency in which
their debts were to be payed. The nucleus of this debtor class was formed
by those who had purchased the Church lands from the Government”
Sargent and Velde (1995) document that the downpayments required to purchase
church lands were in the range 12 − 30%. The rest of the payment was arranged
through promissory notes repayed annually over a period ranging between 10 and 12
years at 5% interest.
Hamilton (1788) also highlights the importance of redistributional concerns for
the credibility of government debt policy:
“There are even dissimilar views ... as to the general principle of discharging the
public debt. Some of them, either less impressed with the importance of national
credit, or because they have little, if any, immediate interest in the question, feel an
indiﬀerence, if not a repugnance, to the payment of the domestic debt at any rate. ...
Others of them, a numerous body of whose citizens are creditors to the public beyond
18proportion ... in the total amount of the national debt, would be strenuous for some
equitable and eﬀective provision.”
Based on this view, Hamilton (1795) argued in favor of the Federal assumption of
the states’ war debt. Debt assumption would provide powerful government creditors
with a strong incentive to support the establishment of a Federal tax legislation, thus
decreasing the risk of default or monetization.
More recently, Faust (1996) has argued that the Federal Reserve Bank’s structure
was a response to public conﬂict over inﬂation’s redistributive eﬀects. The Fed’s
internal power structure emerged in thirty years of legislation culminating in 1935
with the intent to balance voting interests and give fair representation of the ﬁnancial,
agricultural, industrial and commercial interests in the US.
5. Optimal Policy Without Commitment
In this section, I characterize optimal policy with no commitment for economies in
which the Ramsey equilibrium policy is not time consistent. I also quantify the
aggregate welfare loss and the redistributional consequences associated with the dis-
cretionary outcome.
I provide a general deﬁnition of a Markov equilibrium for this economy and illus-
trate its properties for the preference speciﬁcation 3.6.
5.1. The Markov Equilibrium
I restrict attention to stationary Markov equilibria. Here, stationarity means that
the government follows the same allocation rule in each period. The set up parallels
Krusell, Quadrini, Rios-Rull (1997).
Let S be the state of the economy when the government chooses policy. The
state can be made up of exogenous variable or endogenous predetermined variables.
Let x be the set of choice variables for the government, and let ˆ X (S) the policy
rule that the current government and the private sector expect future governments




the set of feasible x’s. Feasibility here involves
resource constraints, competitive equilibrium restrictions and constraints on policy





























19A Markov equilibrium is a policy rule X(S) such that:
X(S)=X (S;X).
Appendix C provides a general algorithm to solve for the Markov equilibrium in
economies with a bidimensional state.
5.2. The Cash-Credit Good Economy
In this section, I deﬁne a Markov equilibrium for the cash-credit good economy in
section 2. This requires identifying the variables S,x and the functions Γ,X ,Ψ and
X.
The state in this economy is given by the distribution of currency and the distri-







This ensures that the cash in advance constraint will hold with equality for both types
and that u11 = u21 both when the cash in advance constraint is binding and when it
is non-binding. Since φ1 does not depend on government policy it does not constitute






for i =1 ,2.
I restrict attention to ψi ≥ 0 for i =1 ,2, since in this case the Ramsey equilibrium
is not time consistent.




















for i =1 ,2.
A prime denotes the following period’s variables. The resource constraint is still given
by (2.4). Future governments are expected to follow the policy rule:
ˆ X (ψ1,ψ2) ≡
n







The government problem is (5.1), where:
w(x)=η1U1 ¡










= {x such that ci1,c i2 ≥ 0,1 − ni,n i ≥ 0 for i =1 ,2,R ≥ 1, (2.4) holds}.




is obtained from the household’s
dynamic budget constraints. Further details on the computation are reported in
Appendix D.















































Figure 5.1: Markov equilibrium policy.
5.3. Findings
The equilibrium outcome depends on the distribution of nominal assets, which de-
termines the redistributional impact of unexpected inﬂation. I compare the Markov
and Ramsey equilibrium outcome for diﬀerent distributions of nominal assets and for
diﬀerent values of the Pareto weight12.Iﬁnd that the Markov equilibrium inﬂation
rate is higher than in the Ramsey equilibrium. The diﬀerence decreases with η1 and
increases with government spending and the aggregate level of outstanding debt. As
in the Ramsey equilibrium, the tax rate on labor increases with η1 and ¯ g.
The results for σ =0 .9, at ¯ g =0 .0715 are displayed in ﬁgure 5.1. For η1 > ¯ η1, the
Markov equilibrium inﬂation rate increases with the fraction of nominal debt held by
type 1 agents, while the converse is true for η1 < ¯ η1. The tax rate on labor is lower
for lower values of η1 and decreases with ψ1 for η1 > ¯ η1, while for η1 < ¯ η1 it increases
with ψ1 for low values of ψ1 and decreases for higher values of ψ1.
12In the Ramsey equilibrium, the initial distribution of debt aﬀects the outcome for t ≥ 0, while
for the Markov equilibrium it only aﬀects the outcome for two consecutive periods. This implies that
any comparison of the Markov and Ramsey outcomes is conditional on the initial portfolio allocation
in the Ramsey equilibrium.
21I also evaluate the welfare costs of lack of commitment by measuring the percentage
amount of leisure that an agent would give up per period to switch from the Markov
to the Ramsey equilibrium. I compare welfare at the benchmark distribution of debt
displayed in Table 1 for diﬀerent values of σ and of η1. Lack of commitment hurts
type 1 agents more. Welfare costs for type 1 agents range from 7 to 10%, while for
type 2 agents are between −5.5 and −1.2%. Aggregate welfare costs, measured as
the percentage fall in the planners’ utility in the Markov equilibrium relative to the
Ramsey, range from 2.4% to 4.8%.
6. Conclusions
I describe a monetary economy in which households are heterogeneous in holdings of
currency and other nominal assets. I study optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy and
the suﬃcient conditions for time consistency. I ﬁnd that heterogeneity substantially
weakens the link between high inﬂation and government deﬁcits and time consistency.
The time consistency of the Ramsey equilibrium depends on the Pareto weights and
the distribution of nominal assets, which determines the costs of unexpected inﬂation.
If the distribution of nominal assets is uneven a policymaker acting under discretion
will not necessarily select a rate of inﬂation higher than previously announced. If
the Ramsey equilibrium is not time consistent, then the “bias” towards high inﬂation
and large deﬁcits due to lack of commitment is larger than in a representative agent
economy, since in this case both eﬃciency and redistributional objectives reinforce
the government’s incentive to deviate.
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247. Appendix
7.1. A: Solving the Ramsey problem






















































m20 = φmm10, and λi and ωt are the multipliers on the implementability constraints
and on the resource constraint for i =1 ,2 and t ≥ 0, respectively. The variable µit
denotes the multiplier for the equality of the relative price of cash and credit goods for
the two types of households, while δt is the multiplier on the constraint that nominal
interest rate is non-negative. The sign of δt is positive in equilibrium, while µit can
be negative, though the sign will be independent of i for t>0. The variable χi ≥ 0
is the multiplier on the cash in advance constraint at time 0, and ζt (which can be
either positive or negative) is the multiplier on the constraint that the net real wage
is the same across agents.
The ﬁrst order necessary conditions for ci1, ci2 and r in (7.1) for t>0 are (I drop
time subscripts to simplify notation):



































































































































where i indexes agents and j indexes goods. In addition, for i =1 ,2:
˜ ζi =( −1)
i−1 ζ.
It’s easy to show that (7.3) and (7.4) imply that ζt < 0 (or ˜ ζ2 > 0 and ˜ ζ1 < 0)f o r














































































































Under assumption (3.6), µ1 =0and δ = µ2h2
2, which implies µ2 ≥ 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 2If taxes are agent speciﬁc, the net real wage need not be
equalized across agents in a competitive equilibrium. The ﬁrst order conditions
for the Ramsey problem are the same as for (7.2) with ζt ≡ 0 for t ≥ 0, since




























for i =1 ,2. (7.7)












is increasing in the real
wage for i =1 ,2. Second, ui2/Ui
2 is increasing in ηi in an equilibrium in which (3.3) is not imposed
and ¯ η1 is deﬁned as the value of the Pareto weight for which (3.3) is non-binding. Lastly, constraint

















where ˜ ζ1 and ˜ ζ2 are the respective multipliers. Intuitively, ˜ ζi > 0 when the government wishes to
redistribute to type i.


























11 in any equilibrium, which implies
r =1 .¥




12 ≤ 0, it is also possible to show that η1 < ¯ η1 is
required for nominal interest rates to be positive in a Ramsey equilibrium.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 3To prove necessity, suppose to the contrary that Qt < 1


















































for i =2 .








































































22, the LHS of this expression in positive. However, from the
concavity of U2 and U2
12 ≤ 0, the RHS of this expression is negative, which generates
a contradiction.
































































which is consistent with r>1 since the LHS is positive and the second expression
in brackets on the RHS is negative.¥
14This holds if h is separable in c21,c 22 or, if it is a CES aggregator, when the elasticity of
substitution is less than 1. This implies that c21 and c22 are NOT gross substitutes.
277 . 2 .B :P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 4
For this particular utility speciﬁcation, it is more convenient to set up the Ramsey



































µit (ui2t − ui1t),
and impose the restrictions implied by (3.7) and (3.8), namely15:
c1j,t
c2j,t
≡ φj, for t>0,
directly into the problem. This implies that:
X =
h
{c11t,c 12t,n 1t,n 2t}t≥0 ,c 210,m10
i
.
The value of φ1 also corresponds to the ratio of currency held by type 2 to currency
held by type 1 for t>0.
The ﬁrst order necessary conditions for t>0 are given by:
(η1 + η2φ1)u11,t+(λ1 + λ2φ1)(1− σ)u11,t−σ(µ1t + φ1µ2t)
u11,t
c11,t
−ωt (ν1 + ν2φ1)=0 ,
(7.9)
(η1 + η2φ2)u12,t+(λ1 + λ2φ2)(1− σ)u12,t+σ(µ1t + φ2µ2t)
u12,t
c12,t
−ωt (ν1 + ν2φ2)=0 ,
(7.10)
−γ (ηi + λi)+ωtνi =0 , (7.11)
µ2t (u12,t − u11,t)=0 ,µ 2t ≥ 0, (7.12)
where here µt is the multiplier on the constraint that the nominal interest rate be
non-negative.
15Equivalently:
u12t = u22t for t ≥ 0,
u11t = u21t for t>0.
28The ﬁrst order conditions for t =0are:
·







λi − χi − νiω =0 , (7.13)
for i =1 ,2, and
0=
·
(η1 + η2φ2)+( λ1 + λ2φ2)(1− σ)+







[λ1ψ1 + λ2φmψ2] − ω(ν1 + ν2φ2),
−λ1 [u11,0 + u22,0ψ1] − λ2φm [u21,0 + u22,0ψ2]+χ1 + χ2φm =0 , (7.15)
µi0 (u22,0 − ui1,0)=0 ,µ i0 ≥ 0,u i1,0 − u22,0 ≥ 0, (7.16)
χi (ci1,0 − mi0)=0 , χi ≥ 0,m i0 − ci10 ≥ 0. (7.17)
To ensure that the allocation at time 0 and at time 1 coincide the following two























(λ1ψ1 + λ2φmψ2)=0 , (7.19)
and φm = φ1.
If u21 >u 22, which occurs if η1 < ¯ η1, the cash in advance constraint should be
binding at time 0 to ensure time consistency. A binding cash in advance constraint
at time 0 implies χi > 0 and µ,µi0 =0 . Therefore, from (7.19):
−(λ1ψ1 + λ2φmψ2)=0 ,
λ1 + λ2φ1 ≥ 0.
Combining (7.18) and (7.15) and using u210 = u110 yields:
−u11 (λ1 + λ2φ1)(1− σ)=0 .
This condition can only be satisﬁed for σ =1 , since λ1 + λ2φ1 =0implies χi =0
which contradicts the assumption that the cash in advance constraint is binding.
If u21 = u22, which occurs when η1 ≥ ¯ η1, the cash in advance constraint has to be
non-binding at time 0. This implies χi =0and by (7.15):
(λ1 + λ2φm)+( λ1ψ1 + λ2φmψ2)=0 .
This restriction, together with (7.18), (7.19), and φm = φ1, makes (7.19) redundant.
The expression in (7.18) reduces to:
(µ1 + µ2φ1) − (µ10 + µ20φ1)+m10 (λ1 + λ2φ1)=0 .
m10 ≥ c11,0 and m1 = c11 for t>0 imply (µ1 + µ2φ1) − (µ10 + µ20φ1) ≤ 0, given
that by assumption. It follow that:
λ1 + λ2φ1 ≥ 0.
297.3. C: Computing the Markov equilibrium
Consider an economy with a bidimensional state, given by S =[ s1,s 2].T h eM a r k o v
equilibrium policy can then be obtained as follows:
1. Select by trial and error a suitable bidimensional interval {[s1, ¯ s1][s2, ¯ s2]} and
select the grid points as the roots of the n +1 st order Chebyshev polynomial,
where n is the order of the polynomial interpolation.
2. Provide an initial guess for the rule ˆ X at each of the n2 grid points.




. Approximate the policy func-
tions based on the initial guess and use Chebyshev interpolation outside the grid
points. Substitute the policies into the one period utility function, giving rise to
the value function. Accelerate the algorithm by assuming that the conjectured
policy function is the one corresponding to the Markov equilibrium and will be
followed henceforth.
4. Given the expected policy and the corresponding value function, solve the gov-
ernment’s maximization problem at each [s1,s 2] on the bidimensional grid de-
ﬁned at step 1, obtain a new government policy function on the grid points.
5. Iterate on steps 3 to 5 until convergence.
7.4. D: Markov Equilibrium for the Cash-Credit Good Economy
Here, I show that all components of the competitive equilibrium allocation, prices
and policy can be identiﬁed from the restrictions imposed in section 5.2, based on
knowledge of the choice variables and of the conjectured policy rule. The restriction
u11 = u21 implies c21/c11 = φm and the cash in advance constraint determines the












Equilibrium labor supply can be determined from the dynamic budget constraint.
To do this we ﬁrst rewrite the wealth evolution equations in terms of the choice























i1 =( 1 − zi)(c0
i1)
−σ ,
u0
11ξ1 = u0
21ξ2.
31